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Abstract
This paper presents a method of estimating the avail-
ability of fault-tolerant computer systems with several
recovery procedures. A segregated failures model has
been proposed recently for this purpose. This pa-
per provides further analysis and extension of this
model. The segregated failures model is compared
with a Markov chain model and is extended for the
situation when the coverage factor is unknown and
failure escalation rates must be used instead. This
situation is illustrated in detail by estimating avail-
ability of a Lucent Technologies Reliable Clustered
Computing architecture. For this example, numeric
values are provided for availability indexes and the
contribution of each recovery procedure to total sys-
tem availability is analysed.
Keywords: software, fault-tolerance, availability, re-
liability, recovery, failures model.
1 Introduction
Some computer systems allow a variety of ways to re-
store service after a failure. We say such systems have
several recovery procedures. For example, recovery
procedure 1 can be a restart of a current application.
If the restart of the application does not succeed, the
computer can be restarted (recovery procedure 2). If
the computer is still down after the restart, a repair
or replacement is necessary (recovery procedure 3).
An example of an industrial computer system with
several recovery procedures is a Lucent Technolo-
gies Reliable Clustered Computing (RCC) applica-
tion (Hughes-Fenchel 1997). One of the basic recovery
procedures for RCC is a switchover to a spare com-
puter. Reliability and availability of systems with sev-
eral recovery procedures have been studied by Hoe-
flin & Mendiratta (1995), Lyu & Mendiratta (1999),
and Mendiratta (1998) for RCC products and by Ibe,
Howe & Trivedi (1989), Sun, Han & Levendel (2001),
and Sun, Han & Levendel (2003) for other systems.
Markov chains have been used as the most popular
approach to reliability and availability investigation of
systems with several recovery procedures (Ibe, Howe
& Trivedi 1989, Lyu & Mendiratta 1999, Mendiratta
1998, Sun, Han & Levendel 2003). In Vilkomir et
al. (2005), we have suggested a simpler analytical
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method of availability evaluation as an alternative.
This method allows calculation of availability with-
out using special tools and yields an assessment of the
impact of every recovery procedure to system avail-
ability.
This paper continues the investigation started in
Vilkomir et al. (2005) and considers the further anal-
ysis and extension of a segregated failures model. The
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a
brief review of the segregated failures model based on
Vilkomir et al. (2005) and then continues with new
analysis and an extension of this model. In section 3,
we compare our model with the Markov chain model.
Small examples show the difference of approaches to
availability evaluation for these two models and the
advantages of using the segregated failures model are
presented. We extend the model for the situation
when coverage factors are unknown and show how to
use rates of escalation instead. In section 4, a case
study of an RCC application is considered in order
to illustrate the extension of the segregated failures
model. Because the RCC application has been previ-
ously considered by Lyu & Mendiratta (1999) using
the Markov chain model, it provides an additional
chance to compare the two approaches.
2 Segregated failures model of a system with
several recovery procedures
Consider a system with n (n > 1) different recov-
ery procedures. For every procedure from 1 to n− 1,
the result of the recovery can be either successful or
unsuccessful. Level n recovery is always successful.
When a failure occurs, recovery procedures are ap-
plied sequentially starting from level 1. If the recov-
ery procedure at level 1 is unsuccessful, the level 2
procedure is applied, etc. However, if at any level
it is determined for a specific failure that the usage
of next recovery levels will not help, these levels can
be skipped and the procedure of the last level n can
be applied directly. Thus, there are three possibil-
ities when a failure recovery is attempted at level
i, 1 ≤ i < n:
• The recovery is successful.
• The recovery is unsuccessful and the next level
procedure will be applied (the failure is escalated
from level i to the next level i+ 1).
• The recovery is unsuccessful and the highest level
procedure will be applied (the failure is escalated
to level n).
These possibilities reflect real Lucent Technologies
Reliable Clustered Computing applications as consid-
ered below in the Case Study section. The model can
be extended to consider additional hypothetic possi-
bilities such as:
• Skipping some restoration levels but not all of
them.
• Using diagnostics that allows changing the order
of recovery procedures for every specific failure
depending on the nature of the failure.
We do not address these extensions in this paper but
they are straightforward.
The ability of the recovery procedure to success-
fully restore a failure is described by a coverage
factor. More precisely, a coverage factor prec,i of
the recovery level i is a conditional probability that
a failure is successfully recovered at level i given that
this failure is served at level i. In that way, a cover-
age factor prec,i is the probability of the first of three
mentioned above possibilities. Denote as pnext,i the
probability of second and as plast,i the probability of
the third possibility.
When a recovery procedure is successful, we as-
sume it provides full (not partial) recovery. This as-
sumption is valid for many practical situations includ-
ing the case study in section 4. Another assumption
is that recovery duration is a random variable. This
assumption is a traditional one and does not require
special explanations. We consider the same distribu-
tion of recovery time whether the procedure is suc-
cessful or not. To model it, we use restoration rate
µi or mean restoration time τi = 1/µi. These indexes
describe here only the duration of restoration, not its
result (successful or unsuccessful). To highlight it, we
will also use a term mean processing time for τi.
The main idea of the proposed approach is clas-
sifying processor failures into several types and eval-
uating the influence of each type of failure on the
availability of the whole system. We propose the fol-
lowing definition of failure of type i: a failure f is said
to be a failure of type i if and only if i is the lowest
level where this failure is successfully recovered.
The described division of failures into types and
the main parameters of the model are shown in Fig.
1, where λ is a system failure rate.
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Figure 1: Segregated failures model
In Vilkomir et al. (2005), we had proposed using
six main steps to evaluate availability according the
segregated failures model.
At step 1, different types of failures should be de-
termined corresponding to the recovery levels.
At step 2, probability ptypek that a failure belongs
type k is evaluated for each type k. For type 1,
ptype1 = prec,1 × pnext,0 (1)
For types k, 1 < k < n,
ptypek = prec,k ×
k−1∏
i=1
pnext,i × pnext,0 (2)
For type n,
ptypen = (plast,1 +
n−2∑
j=2
(plast,j ×
j−1∏
i=1
pnext,i)+
+
n−1∏
i=1
pnext,i)× pnext,0 + plast,0 (3)
At step 3, the failure rate λtypek is evaluated for
failures of each type k:
λtypek = λ× ptypek (4)
where ptypek are deternined by (1), (2), and (3) .
At step 4, the restoration rate µtypek is evaluated
for failures of each type k. For failures of type k, the
mean restoration time τtypek includes mean process-
ing time τk at level k and also time which has been
unsuccessfully spent on recovery at the previous lev-
els:
τtypek =
k∑
i=1
τi (5)
The restoration rate is:
µtypek =
1∑k
i=1
1
µi
(6)
where µi is restoration (service) rate for the recovery
procedure at level i.
At step 5, the availability is evaluated for failures
of each type k. The expected down time Tdk during
a fixed period of time T relative to failures of type k
is:
Tdk(T ) = T (1−Ak) = T λtypek
λtypek + µtypek
(7)
where Ak = µtypek/(λtypek +µtypek) - availability fac-
tor.
When λtypek ¿ µtypek , it is possible to use the
approximate value of the down time per year:
Tdk = λtypekτtypek (8)
calculating λtypek in ‘failures per year’and τtypek in
minutes.
At step 6, the down time of the whole system is
evaluated:
Td =
n∑
k=1
Tdk (9)
3 Analysis and further extension of the
model
3.1 Comparison with a Markov chain model
In this section we illustrate similarities and differences
between the Markov chain model and the segregated
failures model. The Markov chain model for a sys-
tem with several recovery levels is illustrated in Fig.
2. Despite a certain similarity between Fig. 1 (Seg-
regated failures model) and Fig. 2 (Markov chain
model), they have different meanings.
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Figure 2: Markov chain model.
The circles in Fig. 2 represent states of a system:
one working state and several faulted states for every
recovery level. The arrows represent transitions be-
tween system states. In contrast, the circles in Fig.
1 represent sets of failures. The arrows represent re-
lationships between these sets, i.e., how one set of
failures is divided into other sets (with corresponding
probabilities). The two models use the same input
data and lead to the same results but use different
approaches to system availability evaluation.
The Markov chain model is a powerful mathemat-
ical approach and allows modelling of many aspects
of a system’s behaviour, not just availability. Us-
ing the Markov chain model, the probabilities of sys-
tem states are evaluated. Knowing the probability
of a normal (working) state, the system availabil-
ity can be evaluated. However, calculations based
on this model can be quite complicated (solving the
Chapman-Kolmogorov equations). Special tools are
often required for this type of analysis. The segre-
gated failures model is designed for a specific purpose
- availability evaluation of systems with several re-
covery procedures. System states are not considered
and an impact of different types of failures on system
availability is considered instead. In contrast to the
Markov chain model, calculations are very simple and
do not required of using any tools.
The segregated failures model is proposed not in-
stead of but in addition to the Markov chain model.
Taking into account the computational complexity of
the Markov chain model, we believe it is useful to have
a simple engineering analytical method of availability
evaluation. To illustrate this, consider an application
of both models to the following simple toy example:
• A system has two different recovery procedures.
• The probability that a failure is recovered by the
first procedure is 2/3.
• The mean restoration time for the first recovery
procedure is 30 times less then for the second
one.
Both models for this case are represented in Fig. 3,
where
• λ - system failure rate.
• µ - recovery rate for the second procedure.
• Pi, i = 0, 1, 2 - probabilities of system states.
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Figure 3: System with two recovery procedures: a)
Segregated failures model and b) Markov chain model
Application of the segregated failures model for
this example is so simple that it requires only mental
calculations. Thus, the failure rates for failures of the
each type from (4) are
λtype1 =
2
3
λ; λtype2 =
1
3
λ (10)
The mean restoration times for failures of the each
type from (5) are
τtype1 =
1
30µ
; τtype2 =
1
30µ
+
1
µ
=
31
30µ
(11)
Finally, the system down time can be found using
(9):
Td =
2
3
λ
1
30µ
+
1
3
λ
31
30µ
=
11λ
30µ
(12)
Application of the Markov chain model is slightly
more complicated. We need to solve the following
simultaneous equations:
λP0 = 20µP1 + µP2 (13)
30µP1 = λP0 (14)
µP2 = 10µP1 (15)
P0 + P1 + P2 = 1 (16)
Transposing (14) for P1 and (15) for P2 and sub-
stituting P1 and P2 into (16) gives
P0 +
λ
30µ
P0 +
λ
3µ
P0 = 1 (17)
and
P0 =
30µ
11λ+ 30µ
(18)
The system down time during time period T can
be expressed as
Td = (1− P0)T (19)
Considering down time during T = 1year and us-
ing (18) , we finally have
Td =
11λ
11λ+ 30µ
(20)
In practice usually λtypek ¿ µtypek and from (20)
the approximate value of the down time is
Td =
11λ
30µ
(21)
which completely coincides with result (12) of the
segregated failures model.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the
example:
• The segregated failures model provides the ap-
proximate values of the down time which are
very close to the accurate values. Thus, if λ =
10 per year and µ = 1 per hour, the accurate
value of Td according (20) is 219.91min per year.
The approximate value of Td according to (12)
or (21) is 220.00 min per year. The difference
is only 0.04% and is negligible, especially taking
into account an approximation of the input data.
• The complexity of calculations according to the
Markov chain model increases when the number
of recovery procedures increases. At the same
time, the complexity of calculations according to
the segregated failures model changes insignifi-
cantly. Thus, the benefit of using the segregated
failures model increases when more recovery pro-
cedure are used.
• Both the Markov chain model and the segre-
gated failures model allow us to evaluate the sys-
tem down time. However, the segregated failures
model also provides a separate evaluation of the
down times for each recovery procedure. This
in turn allows us to analyze availability in more
detail and to find ways to improve availability.
3.2 Rates of escalation instead of the cover-
age factor
In this section we propose an extension of the segre-
gated failures model for the situation when the input
data are different from what was considered previ-
ously. As was mentioned in Section 2, we assumed
that some conditional (given that level i procedure is
applied) probabilities are known. Specifically, prob-
ability that a failure recovery is successful (prec,i) or
that a failure recovery is unsuccessful and that the
next recovery level is either level i + 1 (pnext,i ) or
last level n (plast,i ). For applications of the Markov
chain model, explicit rates of transitions between sys-
tem states are often used as input data instead of
these probabilities. This situation is also possible for
the segregated failures model. In this case, the input
data for the model are:
• µrec,i - successful failure recovery rate.
• µnext,i - rate of the escalation from level i to the
next level i+ 1.
• µlast,i - rate of the escalation from level i to the
last level n.
These three possibilities are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive. So the failure processing rate µi at
level i (i.e. failure exit rate regardless of the results
of recovery) is a sum of rates for these possibilities:
µi = µrec,i + µnext,i + µlast,i (22)
The best way to evaluate availability in this sit-
uation is to express prec,i, pnext,i, and plast,i using
µrec,i, µnext,i and µlast,i and then to apply the ba-
sic segregated failures model described in Section 2.
Each probability is determined as a ratio of the cor-
responding rate to the failure processing rate of the
whole procedure:
prec,i =
µrec,i
µi
=
µrec,i
µrec,i + µnext,i + µlast,i
(23)
pnext,i =
µnext,i
µi
=
µnext,i
µrec,i + µnext,i + µlast,i
(24)
plast,i =
µlast,i
µi
=
µlast,i
µrec,i + µnext,i + µlast,i
(25)
To apply the model from Section 2, we also need
to express mean service (processing) time τi at level
i. For traditional systems with one recovery proce-
dure, the mean restoration time is a reciprocal value
of the failure restoration rate. For systems with sev-
eral recovery procedures, there are different rates for
each level, in particular, rates of successful failure re-
covery µrec,i and failure processing rate µi. Because
we assume that the mean processing time for a spe-
cific level is the same for all failures and independent
of restoration results, this time is a reciprocal value
of the failure processing rate, not of the successful
recovery rate. In other words,
τi =
1
µi
=
1
µrec,i + µnext,i + µlast,i
(26)
Using (23) - (26) allows us to evaluate availability
of a system with known explicit rates of escalation,
leading to the situation described in Section 2.
4 A Case Study: Describing recovery policy
by rates of escalation without the use of
coverage factor
4.1 A model
As an example of a model with rates of escalation
we consider a hypothetical RCC application, which
has been analyzed by Lyu & Mendiratta (1999) us-
ing a Markov chain model. We reuse notation and
inputs from Lyu & Mendiratta (1999) in our model
which allows us to compare different approaches to
availability evaluation.
The model has four recovery procedures:
• Fault Detection and Recovery. A small number
of hardware and software faults are detected by
the watchdog and recovery is fully automatic.
The internal data are not saved and the appli-
cation is restarted at the initial internal state.
• Volatile Data Recovery. Periodic checkpointing
is used and the critical volatile data are saved.
The process automatically restarts at the most
recent checkpointed internal state.
• Persistent Data Recovery. Replication of the per-
sistent data on a backup disk is carried out. This
ensures data consistency when the application is
automatically recovered on the backup node.
• Manual Repair. For all hardware and software
faults when attempts of automatic recovery are
not successful, manual intervention is used. In
addition, a small set of faults is detected for man-
ual repair before applying procedures of the au-
tomatic recovery.
A diagrammatic representation of the model is
shown in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: Segregated failures model with rates of es-
calation.
Model inputs are the following:
• λ - total failure rate.
• λi, i = 1, 2, 3 - level i to i+ 1 escalation rate.
• µi, i = 1, 2, 3 - recovery rate at level i.
• µ - manual repair rate.
• c - fault detection coverage.
• ci, i = 1, 2 - level i to i+ 1 coverage.
The values of input data are the following (Lyu &
Mendiratta 1999):
λ = 10, 20, 30 failures per year
λ1 = 30 exits per hour
λ2 = 1800 exits per hour
λ3 = 100 exits per hour
µ1 = 30, 60 recoveries per hour
µ2 = 1800, 3600 recoveries per hour
µ3 = 3600 recoveries per hour
µ = 0.25 repair per hour
c, c1, c2 = 0.9, 0.99
4.2 Availability evaluation
Step 1: The model has the following four failure types:
• Type 1: failures restored by the fault detection
and recovery procedure.
• Type 2: failures restored by the volatile data re-
covery procedure.
• Type 3: failures restored by the persistent data
recovery procedure.
• Type 4: failures restored by the manual repair
procedure.
Step 2: To turn from rates of escalation to cover-
age factors, let us calculate conditional probabilities
prec,i, pnext,i, and plast,i. The application of (23) -
(25) gives the following:
prec,i =
µi
µi + λi
, i = 1, 2, 3 (27)
pnext,i =
λici
µi + λi
, i = 1, 2 (28)
pnext,3 =
λ3
µ3 + λ3
(29)
plast,i =
λi(1− ci)
µi + λi
, i = 1, 2 (30)
Now we can calculate ptypei applying (1) - (3):
ptype1 =
cµ1
µ1 + λ1
(31)
ptype2 =
cλ1c1µ2
(µ1 + λ1)(µ2 + λ2)
(32)
ptype3 =
cλ1c1λ2c2µ3
(µ1 + λ1)(µ2 + λ2)(µ3 + λ3)
(33)
ptype4 = c× (
λ1(1− c1)
(µ1 + λ1)
+
λ1c1λ2(1− c2)
(µ1 + λ1)(µ2 + λ2)
+
+
λ1c1λ2c2λ3
(µ1 + λ1)(µ2 + λ2)(µ3 + λ3)
) + 1− c (34)
Step 3: use (4) and values of prec,i, pnext,i, and
plast,i (obtained at Step 2) for the calculation of
λtypei .
Step 4: For the evaluation of the mean restoration
time τtypei for failures of the every type i, we firstly
calculate the mean processing time τi for the every
level i using formulas τi = 1µi+λi , i = 1, 2, 3 and τ4 =
1
µ4
. Then we find τtypei using (5). The results of the
calculation are shown in Table 1.
Level/ Mean resto- µ1 = 30 µ1 = 60
Type ration time µ2 = 1800 µ2 = 3600
1 τ1 1.0 0.67
τtype1 1.0 0.67
2 τ2 0.02 0.01
τtype2 1.02 0.68
3 τ3 0.02 0.02
τtype3 1.03 0.7
4 τ4 240 240
τtype4 241.03 240.7
Table 1: Mean restoration time (minutes).
Step 5 - 6: The intermediate results and values
Tdi and Td of the down time according to (8) - (9)
are presented in Table 2 for µ1 = 30, µ2 = 1800 and
Table 3 for µ1 = 60, µ2 = 3600.
The comparison of these results with the results
from Lyu & Mendiratta (1999), where the same case
study has been analyzed using the Markov chain
model, shows that the values of the down time from
Type of Failure rate and ci = 0.99 ci = 0.9
failures down time λ = 10 λ = 20 λ = 30 λ = 10 λ = 20 λ = 30
1 λtype1 4.95 9.9 14.85 4.50 9.00 13.50
Td1 5.0 9.9 14.9 4.5 9.0 13.5
2 λtype2 2.45 4.9 7.35 2.03 4.05 6.07
Td2 2.5 5.0 7.5 2.1 4.1 6.2
3 λtype3 2.36 4.72 7.08 1.77 3.55 5.32
Td3 2.4 4.9 7.3 1.8 3.7 5.5
4 λtype4 0.24 0.48 0.72 1.7 3.40 5.11
Td4 57.9 115.7 173.6 410.2 820.5 1230.7
System down time Td 68 135 203 419 837 1256
Table 2: Failure rates (per year) and expected down time (minutes per year) for µ1 = 30, µ2 = 1800.
Type of Failure rate and ci = 0.99 ci = 0.9
failures down time λ = 10 λ = 20 λ = 30 λ = 10 λ = 20 λ = 305
1 λtype1 6.60 13.20 19.80 6.00 12.00 18.00
Td1 4.4 8.8 13.3 4.0 8.0 12.1
2 λtype2 2.18 4.36 6.53 1.80 3.60 5.40
Td2 1.5 2.9 4.4 1.2 2.4 3.7
3 λtype3 1.05 2.10 3.15 0.79 1.58 2.36
Td3 0.7 1.5 2.2 0.6 1.1 1.7
4 λtype4 0.17 0.34 0.52 1.41 2.82 4.24
Td4 41.6 83.3 124.9 339.9 679.7 1019.6
System down time Td 48 97 145 346 691 1037
Table 3: Failure rates (per year) and expected down time (minutes per year) for µ1 = 60, µ2 = 3600.
both models are practically the same. The difference
is on average less than 0.5%, which can be explained
by rounding off the decimal. Whereas results from
Lyu & Mendiratta (1999) provide only the system
down time values, Tables 2 and 3 also provide the
down time for each recovery procedure.
Two conclusions can be directly drawn from Tables
2 and 3:
• System down time is proportional to the value of
the total failure rate; that is also clear from the
formulas (4) and (8).
• Increasing the value of the fault detection cover-
age ci significantly decreases down time.
The value of the fault detection coverage ci deter-
mines the number of failures that are escalated from
the level i to the next level (not to last level directly).
Increasing ci from 0.9 to 0.99 decreases down time
several times (6.2 times from 419 min to 68 min for
µ1 = 30, µ2 = 1800; 7.2 times from 346 min to 48 min
for µ1 = 60, µ2 = 3600). However, the fault detec-
tion coverage value depends on the nature of software
failures and cannot always be changed by system de-
signers. Furthermore, systems with a bad diagnostic
subsystem (which cannot determine failures requiring
immediate manual repair) have a greater fault detec-
tion coverage value. But if some failures are eventu-
ally escalated (step by step) through all levels to the
last one, system down time will increase because of
the time lost at each level.
There are at least two ways for designers to im-
prove availability of a system:
• Change recovery strategy.
• Improve individual recovery procedures.
Changing the existing recovery strategy by creating
new recovery procedures can require significant effort
from designers. However, in some cases it is possi-
ble to improve availability just by changing the order
in which recovery procedures are applied. The segre-
gated failures model can be useful for studying such
changing.
An existing recovery procedure can be improved
by reducing mean recovery time for the procedure.
High recovery time for a specific procedure influences
system availability even when the number of failures
restored at this level is negligible. Thus, according to
Tables 2 and 3 for ci = 0.99, on average only 2.1%
of all failures are restored at level 4, i.e. by man-
ual repair. However, the contribution of this level
to system down time comes to 86% (85.1% for µ1 =
30, µ2 = 1800 and 86.7% for µ1 = 60, µ2 = 3600).
The reason is that, according to Table 1, the mean
restoration time for the manual repair is two hundred
times more than the mean restoration time for other
procedures.
Mean restoration time can be reduced by using
better diagnostic equipment, speeding up a delivery
of spare parts, etc. Thus, if the mean restoration
time for the manual repair is reduced by 20% (from
240 min to 192 min) then, according to (8) and (9),
system down time will be reduced on average by 18%.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered fault-tolerant computer
systems with several recovery procedures. We contin-
ued the earlier investigations described in Vilkomir
et al. (2005) by investigating the segregated fail-
ures model for availability evaluation of such systems.
This model provides a simple analytical method of
evaluating system availability and can be used as an
alternative to Markov chain models. We analysed
both approaches and showed that the segregated fail-
ures model not only allows us to calculate down time
of a whole system but also gives the possibility, using
intermediate results of calculations, of evaluating the
impact of each recovery procedure on system avail-
ability. The model can also be used for the correc-
tion of a recovery strategy and improvement of system
availability.
We extended the segregated failures model for the
situation when the values of implicit rates of failures
escalation are known instead of coverage factors. As
a case study, a Lucent Technologies Reliable Clus-
tered Computing architecture was considered. Dif-
ferent values of failure restoration rates were consid-
ered and their influence on down time was analysed.
The values of down time for every type of failures
as well as for the whole system were calculated. For
this specific case study, the main factor that impacted
system availability was the mean restoration time for
the manual repair. Thus, reducing this time is an
important practical task to improve availability.
The case study shows that the segregated failures
model provides a simple, convenient and practical ap-
proach for availability evaluation. In future work, we
will consider an application of this model to the anal-
ysis of different recovery strategies and selection of an
optimal strategy for any given system.
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